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February 2004 issue: Nominating Committee to Select Council Candidates The Bankruptcy Section Nominating Committee will meet in April, 2004 to select a slate of candidates for the July election. Kmart Decision 7th Circuit Court of Appeals affirms Kmart Decision The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed a lower court ruling
that the Bankruptcy Court erred in allowing Kmart to pay pre-petition vendors
under the "critical vendor" doctrine. In the opinion, Judge Easterbrook
noted that the "'doctrine of necessity' is just a fancy name for a power
to depart from the Code. ... today it is the Code rather than the norms of nineteenth
century railroad reorganizations that must prevail." A copy of the complete decision can be found here. Washington Hot News Senate floor action on HR 975? With the recent procedural move by House Republicans attempting to force the issue of bankruptcy reform, without the "traditional" steps in the Senate, it is believed a bipartisan group of Senators will in the next week urge Senate Majority Leader Frist (R-Tenn.) to schedule the bill for floor action. Want some RECOGNITION? The Bankruptcy Section Newsletter Committee is looking for volunteers to write a Case Analysis for an upcoming edition. The Case Analysis is typically based on Court of Appeals or Supreme Court decisions, although one can use their discretion to discuss relevant BAP, District Court and Bankruptcy Court decisions. If you are interested or would like to learn more, please send an email to the Managing Editor . Click here to view newsletter archives. Your subscription You have been subscribed to this list as part of your membership in the Bankruptcy Section of the Commercial Law League of America. Changes to your e-mail address and all other comments can be sent to Editor@cllabankruptcy.org CLLA 70 East Lake Street, Suite 630 Phone: 312-781-2000 Newsletter design by: |
If you are having trouble navigating through the newsletter, the online version can be found here. Sua SponteLouis S. Robin I'd like to review two matters this month: legislative issues and the Midwestern's Chicago conference this April. Although I'm sure that you're more interested in an update of what's happening with Bankruptcy legislation in Congress, I'm going to make you read first about Chicago (although I'm sure you're more than able to skip to the second portion). Case AnalysisPaige Barr Non-dischargeability for an Intentional Tort Requires the Actor Intend the Consequences of the Act, Not Simply the Act Itself. Summary: The Tenth Circuit held that a state court judgment for intentional fraud was not dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), where the fraud was a failure to obtain insurance and the judgment was for extensive injuries suffered by plaintiff creditor in an explosion. Case Law UpdatePaige Barr No Compensation From Estate Allowed Under § 330(a)(1) Unless Counsel is Employed by Trustee with Court Approval. Debtor's counsel was denied the compensation he sought under 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) for legal services provided to the debtor after proceeding was converted to chapter 7. The Supreme Court held that in a chapter 7 proceeding § 330(a)(1) does not authorize payment of attorney's fees unless the attorney has been appointed under § 327 of the Code. Analyzing the existing statutory text, rather than predecessor statutes, the Court found that § 330(a)(1) is not ambiguous, regardless of its awkward and ungrammatical characteristics. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Sua Sponte
Timed to begin when you've just finished your tax returns, the Midwestern Conference runs from Thursday, April 15, 2004 through Sunday, April 18, 2004 . For those who can arrive early, the DePaul College of Law Business and Commercial Journal will present a Symposium on UCITA New Articles 1, 2, and 2A, Secret Liens, and Recent Developments in Article 9. Speakers include Professor Ray Nimmer, University of Houston School of Law; Professor John Krahmer, Texas Tech University School of Law; Professor Henry Deeb Gabriel, Loyola New Orleans School of Law; Mark Duedall, Alston & Bird, LLP; Mark E. Liepold, Partner, Gould & Ratner; Professor Ingrid Hillinger, Boston College of Law and Professor Steven Resnicoff, DePaul University College of Law. This is the second year that we have the honor of the Business and Commercial Journal providing us with a program. This year's program will be presented at the Westin Hotel Conference site, and will start at 9:30 a.m. , on April 15, 2004 . For those who are not aware of the relationship between the DePaul Business and Commercial Journal, the Journal recent joined with the Commercial Law League's Law Journal to produce our journal. I urge all to attend. In addition, Cathy Pike and Alan Gordon, our Section's Education Chairs, have put together two wonderful programs, one on Friday, starting at 10:30 a.m. presenting the basics of bankruptcy, and a second on Saturday, starting at 10:30 a.m , on the “Scary Preference.” Judge Wedoff will be leading the second program, and he is always one to provide valuable perspective. Given the wonderful programs that Cathy Pike and Alan Gordon provided us in New York , I would not miss these. In addition, there are a variety of other programs and events in Chicago this year. I hope to see many of you. For your convenience, you can download complete information by clicking here. Concerning legislation in Congress, as many of you know, the House did substitute its version of the Bankruptcy Reform legislation in the Chapter 12 extension legislation. However, indications are that, given the absence of the clause concerning abortion discharge exceptions, the Senate will not act. This is some relief to many of us, although we must all continue to monitor the situation and be prepared to do what we each can. In this regard, Peter Califano (Co-Chair of our Section's Legislative Committee) and I are scheduled to go to the Hill to call on various members in early March. We will keep you informed. Finally, we all owe David Goch, the League's counsel, for keeping us and others informed in the last few weeks. His efforts in keeping everyone aware of the shifting situation may well have been instrumental in recent developments. Louis S. Robin Case AnalysisNon-dischargeability for an Intentional Tort Requires the Actor Intend the Consequences of the Act, Not Simply the Act Itself. Summary: The Tenth Circuit held that a state court judgment for intentional fraud was not dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), where the fraud was a failure to obtain insurance and the judgment was for extensive injuries suffered by plaintiff creditor in an explosion. Facts: Steve Panalis, an independent oilfield contractor, was severely injured while moving a large storage tank. In the process of moving the tank trapped gas escaped and exploded, severely burning portions of Panalis' body. Although the injury occurred on Panalis' own time and without the knowledge of his employer, Panalis and his wife sued Larry Moore, owner of L.P. Moore, Inc., his employer. The couple alleged fraud based upon a statement Moore made about his insurance coverage. The Colorado jury returned a verdict in favor of Panalis, finding that: 1) Moore made a false representation to Panalis that Moore carried insurance that would cover Panalis; 2) Moore knew that representation was false at the time he made it; 3) the representation was made with the intent to deceive; 4) Panalis justifiably relied on the representation; and 5) Panalis suffered damages as a result of the false representation. Panalis and his wife were awarded approximately $6 million in damages. Subsequently, Moore filed a petition for bankruptcy and Panalis filed an action to determine the dischargeability of the debt created by the Colorado verdict. The bankruptcy court ruled that the fraud verdict did not represent a debt for a “willful” injury under § 523(a)(6) and was therefore dischargeable. The district court reversed, finding the debt non-dischargeable because Moore 's fraudulent statement was the intentional deliberate act required by § 523(a)(6). It ruled that Panalis' reliance “caused damage to him” since Moore 's statement had been determined by the jury to have been made with the intent to deceive and intent to be relied upon. Since Colorado law considers fraud an intentional tort, Moore 's statement was further found to have been made with the intent to injure. The district court concluded that the debt was non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(6) given that the result of the fraud was a willful act, an intent to cause injury. Moore appealed the district court's ruling, arguing that Panalis' injury was a result of the explosion, not his statement about insurance coverage. Although he made a fraudulent statement about his insurance coverage, he did not intend to physically injure Panalis. Panalis in turn argued that the jury verdict was the “functional equivalent” of a willful and malicious injury since fraud is an intentional tort under Colorado law and requires that a tortfeasor intend some “harm or offense.” Discussion: In Panalis v. Moore (In re Moore) , 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 1621 (10th Cir. 2004), the Tenth Circuit perceived the case as a question of whether the Colorado verdict awarding damages for fraudulent misrepresentation constitutes debt for a “willful and malicious injury” to Panalis under § 523(a)(6). Following the Supreme Court's holding in Kawaauhau v. Geiger , 523 U.S. 57 (1998), the court restated that intentional torts generally require that the actor intend the consequences of an act, not simply the act itself. Furthermore, “§ 523(a)(6) pertains to ‘only acts done with the actual intent to cause injury,' and ‘non-dischargeability takes a deliberate or intentional injury not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury.'” Allowing liability to a tortfeasor for unintended injuries would permit even a knowing breach of contract to qualify. According to the Supreme Court, “[a] construction so broad would be incompatible with the ‘well-known' guide that exceptions to discharge ‘should be confined to those plainly expressed.'” Moore was found to only hold the intent to deceive. He did not intend Panalis to mishandle an oil storage tank causing the explosion that injured him. Intent to deceive, the court reasoned, is far from intent to willfully and maliciously physically injure. The court differentiated the issues on appeal from the Colorado jury trial, precluding an issue of collateral estoppel. The jury appeared to find on of the consequences of Moore 's intentional fraud was an injury sustained by Panalis. The court concluded that the injury had to have been the loss Panalis suffered because Moore had not obtained insurance to compensate them. The jury's finding that Moore “made the [false] representation with the intent that [Panalis] act or decide not to act, in reliance on the representation,” did not convince the court that the jury found “a false representation was made with the intent that Panalis mishandle an oil storage tank causing the explosion that injured him.” Thus, the court held the verdict to have only established that Moore intended to deceive Panalis. However, since no discussion was included in the Tenth Circuit's opinion of the district court's conclusion that because Colorado law considers fraud an intentional tort, the “state court judgment establishes that Moore's statement was made with intent to injure” it is difficult to determine if an intent to injure was actually found by the jury when the verdict is construed under Colorado law. However, the Tenth Circuit does not that “if there be any question of whether that jury found Mr. Moore intended the physical injury of Mr. Panalis, it is reasonable to assume it would have returned a verdict for punitive damages.” The jury was instructed that it may award punitive damages if it found Moore acted in a “malicious” and “willful” manner. The court therefore concluded that the jury did not find Moore intended the physical injuries Panalis suffered. Under § 523(a)(6), only injuries caused by willful and malicious injury are non-dischargeable. The Court concluded that Panalis' verdict was dischargeable in Moore 's bankruptcy since Panalis failed to prove in the district or bankruptcy court that Moore willfully and maliciously intended to cause physical injury to him (Panalis). Although the district court had ruled in Panalis' favor, the Court considered its analysis incomplete because it overlooked the criticality of the terms “willful” act and “malicious injury” in § 523(a)(6). Without proof of both, an objection to discharge under that section fails. Relying on Kawaauhau v. Geiger , 523 U.S. 57 (1998), the Court explained that the word “willful” in § 523(a)(6) modifies the word “injury,” indicating that non-dischargeability takes a deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury; had Congress meant to exempt debts resulting from unintentionally inflicted injuries, it might have described instead “willful acts that cause injury.” Panalis' theory for non-dischargeability was based upon § 523(a)(6), although the Colorado jury found Moore guilty of fraud. The facts reported in the case do not lend enough insight, if any is available, as to why Panalis did not base his non-dischargeability theory on § 523(a)( 2). The Tenth Circuit rigidly adheres to the holding in Geiger . In Geiger the evidence demonstrated that Dr. Geiger was administering substandard care, and that the substandard care was objectively certain or substantially certain to cause harm to Mrs. Kawaauhau, however the Court held that there was no evidence to suggest that Dr. Geiger desired that the patient suffer serious consequences. The Court determined that Dr. Geiger's conduct was not willful. At most, the debt was attributable to negligent or reckless conduct, not to an intentional tort. Therefore, the facts in Geiger do not parallel the facts in Moore . Geiger did not involve an intentional tort and Moore did. Therefore, the Moore court was not bound to follow the Geiger holding. However, it chose to take Geiger one step further. It is undeniable that the exceptions to discharge should generally be strictly construed in order to avoid abrogating the fundamental principles of bankruptcy, particularly the fresh start notion, as well as rendering other sections of the Code superfluous. However, bankruptcy is supposed to protect the honest but unfortunate debtor. Panalis lied, a fact upheld by a jury of his peers. The notion of a fresh start loses its muster when you have a dishonest debtor attempting to discharge his debt. The logical outcome of Geiger and Moore is to render the actual act committed irrelevant. This outcome muddles the determination of an intentional injury. The difference between a willful and malicious act intended to do injury to a person and a willful act that leads to an injury appears quite difficult to discern. This difficulty is further eroded with the decision in Moore rendering that intentional torts do not necessarily lead to the decision that the debt is a result of intent to injure. Paige Barr Case Law UpdateNo Compensation From Estate Allowed Under § 330(a)(1) Unless Counsel is Employed by Trustee with Court Approval. Debtor's counsel was denied the compensation he sought under 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) for legal services provided to the debtor after proceeding was converted to chapter 7. The Supreme Court held that in a chapter 7 proceeding § 330(a)(1) does not authorize payment of attorney's fees unless the attorney has been appointed under § 327 of the Code. Analyzing the existing statutory text, rather than predecessor statutes, the Court found that § 330(a)(1) is not ambiguous, regardless of its awkward and ungrammatical characteristics. Therefore, a debtor's attorney not engaged under § 327 does not fall within the eligible class of persons that the first part of § 330(a)(1) authorizes to receive compensation: trustees, examiners, and § 327 professional persons. Furthermore, the Court explained that its decision was not a departure from the principle of prompt and effectual administration of bankruptcy law and does not force the congressional intent behind § 330(a)(1) to read as an elimination of the compensation essential to debtors' receipt of legal services. Other alternative means remain available for attorneys to receive compensation since the combination of §§ 327 and 330 allow the chapter 7 trustee to engage attorneys and the courts to award them fees. Also, § 330(a)(1) does not prevent a debtor from engaging in the common practice of paying counsel compensation in advance to ensure that a bankruptcy filing is in order. Lamie v. United States Trustee , 124 S.Ct. 1023 ( Jan. 26, 2004 ). Phoenix Piccadilly Factors are Appropriate to Consider in Single Asset Real Estate Cases. Resolving a dispute among the bankruptcy courts, the Eleventh Circuit held the factors set forth in Phoenix Piccadilly, In re Phoenix Piccadilly, Ltd. , 849 F.2d 1393, 1394 (11th Cir. 1988), are appropriate guidelines for consideration when evaluating whether a Chapter 11 petition in a single asset real estate case was filed in bad faith. Application of these factors was not modified by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994. In re State Street Houses, Inc. , 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 561 (11th Cir. Jan. 15, 2004 ). Repossession did not Terminate Debtor's Equitable Interests in Vehicle. Debtor's equitable interests in her car were not terminated when creditor repossessed the vehicle due to debtor's failure to make timely payments. Virginia 's Uniform Commercial Code- Secured Transactions permits a secured creditor to repossess the collateral protecting its security interest after default by the debtor and gives the debtor the right to redeem the vehicle at any time before the creditor disposes of it. Since the creditor had not taken any steps to dispose of the vehicle at the time of the bankruptcy filing, debtor still possessed her right to redemption. Since debtor's right of redemption is clearly a “legal or equitable interest,” the court determined debtor's statutory right to redeem was part of her bankruptcy estate under § 541(a)(1). Creditor's security interest was adequately protected under the proposed plan since it provided for the payment of all future installments, the curing of all delinquent payments, and the payment of all applicable interest, over the course of the plan. These factors demonstrated that debtor was exercising her right to redeem; thus, the vehicle was subject to the automatic stay and turnover provisions. It was of no consequence that debtor's plan did not provide for a lump sum payment of all outstanding debts. The court declined however to resolve which party holds legal ownership of the repossessed vehicle under state law. Tidewater Finance Co. v. Moffett ( In re Moffett) , 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 1011 (4th Cir. Jan. 23, 2004 ). Chapter 7 Debtor Found to Lack Standing to Object to an Order Concerning Distribution of Estate Assets, Sanctions Imposed. Debtor conceded that the estate was insolvent and that reduction or disallowance of the fee awards would not create a surplus fund from which a distribution to it might be made. The court therefore concluded that debtor lacked standing to appeal the order granting distribution of fees to trustee. Court rejected all reasoning provided by debtor in its attempt to establish standing. First, issues of standing need not be raised in the lower court, the question may be raised sua sponte “as it is akin to subject matter jurisdiction.” Second, debtor's suggestion that is has standing to assert fraud upon the court even though it is not a “person aggrieved” under the statute is meritless since debtor cited no authority and failed to demonstrate any fraud occurred. Finally, even as a corporate debtor, debtor did not have standing under § 505(a)(1) to challenge the order even though its principal had an interest in seeing the orders overturned. Case law relied upon by debtor for this proposition pertained to a chapter 11, rather than chapter 7, debtor, and claimed that the imposition of a § 6672 of the Internal Revenue Code 100% penalty on corporate officers for failure to pay withholding taxes would adversely affect the corporate debtor's operations and reorganization efforts. Here debtor was merely claiming that any funds generated by the reduction of fee awards would be used to pay down IRS priority claims for which its principal was personally liable. Alternative case law relied upon by debtor addressed chapter 7 debtors' standing to seek determination of the dischargeability of a federal tax liability. However, those debtors were individuals, personally liable for the alleged tax liabilities, which is not the same as a corporation challenging orders arguably affecting the personal tax liability of its principal. Court found debtor's standing arguments therefore patently meritless since they mustered no meaningful argument and no pertinent authority on the point. Therefore, sanctions in the form of double costs were granted. Great Road Service Center v. Golden , 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 49 (1st Cir. Jan. 26, 2004 ). Tax Refund Claims Held to be “Non-Core” Proceedings Even When IRS Asserts an Offset Claim. The government questioned taxpayer's standing to pursue his tax refund claims. The court found that although the district court had original bankruptcy “related to” jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1334(b) over the taxpayer's case since the complaint implicated the bankruptcy estate's assets, and the bankruptcy court had “related to” jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.S. § 157 over the taxpayer's tax refund claims, those claims constituted non-core proceedings. The court held that the definition of “core” proceedings should be read narrowly. The court held that § 157(b)(2)(O) is limited to those proceedings “affecting … the adjustment of the debtor-creditor … relationship” brought under Title 11. Bankruptcy courts should narrowly read the § 157(b)(2)(O) “catch all provision” to avoid potential constitutional problems arising from having Article I judges issue final orders in cases requiring an Article III judge, without a party's consent. Thus, under the narrow construction the debtors' claims were found to be non-core proceedings. This decision places the Ninth Circuit at odds with the Sixth Circuit, which previously ruled that a tax refund claim with an alleged IRS offset was a core proceeding because a refund claim with an offset would “affect the adjustment of the debtor-creditor relationship.” The Ninth Circuit justified its departure because “under the Sixth Circuit's view, whether a refund claim is a core or non-core proceeding depends on whether the IRS asserts an offset. The IRS's mere allegation of an offset to a tax refund would deprive a party of its right to Article III adjudication of its refund claim, to which, in the absence of any alleged IRS off-set, it would ordinarily be entitled.” The court reasoned that its approach treats all tax refund claims, “whether the IRS alleges an offset or not, as non-core proceedings entitled to an Article III adjudicator; [thereby safeguarding] a party's right to a life-tenured judge with a salary protection, irrespective of the Government's pleading.” Dunmore v. United States , 2004 U.S. LEXIS 1328 (9th Cir. Jan. 29, 2004 ). Added Twist to the Good-Faith Requirement of the Brunner Test. The Tenth Circuit adopted the Brunner test for determining the dischargeability of student loans, however it added its own caveat within the test's good faith requirement. The court added this qualification since many courts employing the Brunner analysis have “constrained the three Brunner requirements to deny discharge under even the most dire circumstances.” The court reasoned the constrained application of the Brunner test fails to provide a “fresh start” for the honest but unfortunate debtor. The Brunner test adopted by most circuits requires the debtor to prove: “1) that the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and expenses, a minimal standard of living for herself and her dependents if forced to repay the loans; 2) that additional circumstances exist indicating that this state of affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of the student loans; and 3) that the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay the loans.” The court held that terms of the test must be applied such that debtors who truly cannot afford to repay their loans may have their loans discharged. Furthermore, the good faith requirement should consider whether the debtor is acting in good faith in seeking the discharge, or whether he is intentionally creating this hardship. Educational Credit Management Corp. v. Polleys , 2004 U.S. LEXIS 1701 (10th Cir. Feb. 4, 2004 ). Congress Abrogated the Sovereign Immunity of Indian Tribes in 11 U.S.C. § 106(a). Court found Indian tribes to fall within the category of domestic governments, which are abrogated of their sovereign immunity in 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) and 101(27). Court determined Indian tribes are domestic governments since the Supreme Court has recognized that “Indian tribes are ‘domestic dependent nations' that exercise inherent sovereign authority over their members and territories.” Thus, the category “Indian tribes” is a specific member of the group of domestic governments the immunity of which Congress intended to abrogate. The court could find no other statute in which Congress effected a generic abrogation of sovereign immunity and because of which a court was faced with the question of whether such generic abrogation in turn effected specific abrogation of the immunity of a member of the general class. The court found that its reading of § 106(a)'s express abrogation as reaching Indian tribes simply interprets the statute's reach in accord with both the common meaning of its language and the use of similar language by the Supreme Court. Krystal Energy Co. v. Navajo Nation , 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 2061 (9th Cir. Feb. 10, 2004 ). An Unstayed State Court Judgment that is Pending Appeal May Constitute a “Bona Fide Dispute” For Purposes of the Code. Defendant was unable to pay accrued balances on various credit cards. Plaintiff held some of defendant's accounts and reduced some of his debts to judgment in state court. While those judgments were pending appeal, plaintiff filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition against defendant, seeking to enforce its unstayed state court judgments in bankruptcy. Defendant claimed the judgments were subject to a “bona fide dispute,” and therefore plaintiff was precluded from filing the petition under § 303(b)(2). Defendant claimed his credit card debts were subject to a bona fide dispute, because the credit card issuers failed to comply with the state's Retail Credit Accounts Law. Court held that a creditor like the plaintiff may not reduce a claim to judgment elsewhere and then automatically seek enforcement in bankruptcy, at least where the judgment to be enforced is pending an appeal that presents substantial factual or legal questions. However, the court further held that “the mere fact that a judgment is pending appeal does not mean that a bona fide dispute exists, any more than the fact that a state court has rendered judgment means that a bona fide dispute does not exist.” The court rejected the district court's methodology of asking whether under state law plaintiff's unstayed state court judgments were final for purposes of res judicata. According to the court, the correct inquiry is whether the debtor's appeals were genuine. Since defendant offered little more than his belief that the credit card issuers failed to comply with the state's Retail Credit Accounts Law, the court failed to find a bona fide dispute. A debtor's subjective beliefs do not give rise to a bona fide dispute. A debtor cannot defeat plaintiff's standing to file under § 303(b)(2) simply by refusing to concede the validity of plaintiff's claim, without presenting any evidence to support his factual and legal arguments. Platinum Financial Servs. Corp. v. Byrd (In re Byrd) , 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 2243 (4th Cir. Feb. 11, 2004 ). Paige Barr Washington Hot NewsSenate floor action on HR 975? With the recent procedural move by House Republicans attempting to force the issue of bankruptcy reform, without the "traditional" steps in the Senate, it is believed a bipartisan group of Senators will in the next week urge Senate Majority Leader Frist (R-Tenn.) to schedule the bill for floor action. However, this step is unlikely to be successful as many Senate Democrats, including the ranking member on the Senate Judiciary Committee, have indicated the bill must go through committee. Also, recent comments by Senate Minority Leader Daschle (D-SD) about Republicans excluding the minority from conferences/negotiations/the legislative process does not create a high expectation that any such maneuver would be successful. NTEU Opposes Administration Proposal To Use Private Companies On January 26th, speaking before the Internal Revenue Service Oversight Board on IRS workforce issues, The National Treasury Employees Union reiterated its opposition to a Bush administration proposal to use private collection professionals to collect tax debts. NTEU President Colleen Kelley said the Treasury Department's 2005 budget proposal is "risky, costly, and unnecessary." According to Kelly, the use of private debt collection professionals increases the risk of abusive treatment of taxpayer and improper disclosure of confidential taxpayer information. Kelly also asserted that IRS employees are more efficient at collecting federal income taxes, collecting $31 for every dollar spent while private collection professionals produce only $3 in revenue for each dollar spent. The proposal to use private collection agencies first appeared in the president's 2004 budget and was included in tax bills considered by the House and Senate tax committees in 2003 but did not survive in the omnibus appropriations bill (H.R. 2673) that included the IRS budget for 2004. Key Democrats Send Dear Colleague Letter to House The following "Dear Colleague" letter was sent to members of the US House of Representatives by key Democrat members regarding bankruptcy reform.
Nominating Committee to Select Council CandidatesThe Bankruptcy Section Nominating Committee will meet in April, 2004 to select a slate of candidates for the July election. Candidates must be willing to commit themselves to a three-year term of active involvement in Council and Section Affairs and be able to attend four Council meetings. Section members interested in being considered for an Executive Council position should submit a letter immediately stating their interest and indicating their qualifications. All letters/emails must be received by April 2, 2004. Please send letters to: Ms. Judith Greenstone Miller One Woodward Avenue, Suite 2400 , Email: jmiller@jafferaitt.com
Sarah A. Jolie, Staff Liaison 70 East Lake Street, Suite 630 Email: sjolie@clla.org |
I'd
like to review two matters this month: legislative issues and the Midwestern's
Chicago conference this April. Although I'm sure that you're more interested
in an update of what's happening with Bankruptcy legislation in Congress, I'm
going to make you read first about Chicago (although I'm sure you're more than
able to skip to the second portion).